Capacitor Android and iOS: remote content can be loaded at the app origin via the internal HTTP proxy path

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

9.3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N

EPSS

• CVE-2026-103922: 0.34% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 27.50 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Impact Capacitor's WebView navigation guard validated only the host and scheme of a target URL, not its path. Because the internal HTTP proxy path (/capacitorhttpinterceptor) is served at the application's own origin, a frame navigation to it was always treated as in-app navigation and allowed. Loading that path as a document caused the native layer to fetch an arbitrary, caller-specified URL and return the response body to the WebView at the app's own origin. Script in that response then ran with full same-origin trust: access to localStorage, cookies, and every native capability the application exposes through its registered Capacitor plugins. The proxy handler was additionally served regardless of whether the CapacitorHttp plugin was enabled, so applications that never enabled CapacitorHttp were also affected. Exploitation requires a victim to activate a link inside the application's WebView. Any Capacitor application that renders user-controlled or unsanitized links (chat…

Published by the source

5 Oct 2026, 22:53 UTC

Last modified by the source

5 Oct 2026, 22:53 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 13:06 UTC

1. Revision 2 · amended · 26 Oct 2026

   Amended from ghsa record GHSA-rvm3-566m-v7fv

2. Revision 1 · created · 23 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-rvm3-566m-v7fv

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-103922

Advisory: Capacitor Android and iOS: remote content can be loaded at the app origin via the internal HTTP proxy path
IDs: CVE-2026-103922, GHSA-rvm3-566m-v7fv
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-103922 (revision 2, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 13:06 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Critical (CVSS 9.3)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Partial vendor fix; fixed versions by package: @capacitor/android 8.5.1, 8.4.3, 7.6.9, 6.2.2; com.capacitorjs:core 8.5.1, 8.4.3, 7.6.9, 6.2.2; @capacitor/ios 8.5.1, 8.4.3, 7.6.9, 6.2.2. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- npm @capacitor/android: affected >= 6.0.0, < 6.2.2; >= 7.0.0, < 7.6.9; >= 8.5.0, < 8.5.1; >= 8.3.5, < 8.4.3; >= 8.0.0, <= 8.3.4; fixed in 8.4.3, 8.5.1, 6.2.2, 7.6.9
- Maven com.capacitorjs:core: affected >= 6.0.0, < 6.2.2; >= 7.0.0, < 7.6.9; >= 8.5.0, < 8.5.1; >= 8.3.5, < 8.4.3; >= 8.0.0, <= 8.3.4; fixed in 8.4.3, 8.5.1, 6.2.2, 7.6.9
- npm @capacitor/ios: affected >= 6.0.0, < 6.2.2; >= 7.0.0, < 7.6.9; >= 8.5.0, < 8.5.1; >= 8.3.5, < 8.4.3; >= 8.0.0, <= 8.3.4; fixed in 8.4.3, 8.5.1, 6.2.2, 7.6.9

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- `npm ls @capacitor/android --all`: lists every installed copy and version, including transitive ones. Run in the project root after `npm ci`.
- Maven com.capacitorjs:core: check the installed version with your package manager.
- `npm ls @capacitor/ios --all`: lists every installed copy and version, including transitive ones. Run in the project root after `npm ci`.

## Supported action
No complete vendor fix is recorded. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check this record again before closing anything.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on @capacitor/android, com.capacitorjs:core, @capacitor/ios.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-rvm3-566m-v7fv (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-rvm3-566m-v7fv lists affected ranges: npm @capacitor/android >=6.0.0 =7.0.0 =8.5.0 =8.3.5 =8.0.0 =6.0.0 =7.0.0 =8.5.0 =8.3.5 =8.0.0 <=8.3.4)
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-rvm3-566m-v7fv (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-rvm3-566m-v7fv lists affected ranges: npm @capacitor/android >=6.0.0 =7.0.0 =8.5.0 =8.3.5 =8.0.0 =6.0.0 =7.0.0 =8.5.0 =8.3.5 =8.0.0 =6.0.0 =7.0.0 =8.5.0 =8.3.5 =8.0.0 <=8.3.4)

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