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Medium, CVSS 6.3amended

ip-address: Address6 builds a parse diagnostic proportional to the input with no length bound, allowing a single long string to stall or crash the process

CVE-2026-101911GHSA-h3mg-xc3c-68pw

What to do

Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (ip-address 10.7.1), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.

This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.

Affected packages

Sources

Severity and exploitation
Exploitation
No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
CVSS 4.0
6.3 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N · score source
EPSS
  • CVE-2026-101911: 0.38% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 32.40 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary new Address6() and Address6.isValid() place no bound on the length of the string they parse. When the string contains a character that cannot appear in an IPv6 address, the parser builds a diagnostic that wraps every such character in a 34-byte <span class="parse-error", so the work and the memory scale with the input rather than with an address. A 1 MiB string of ! costs about 110 MB and 70 ms of synchronous work, 8 MiB costs about 800 MB and half a second, 16 MiB throws a RangeError in place of the documented AddressError, and 32 MiB aborts the Node process. isValid() builds the diagnostic and discards it, so a caller that only asks whether a string is valid pays the full price. An application that validates an attacker-supplied string with these methods can be stalled or crashed by a single oversized request. This is a crash on input that should have been rejected cleanly, which SECURITY.md lists as in scope. Details parse() in src/ipv6.ts checks for characters outside…

Dates and revisions
Published by the source
Last modified by the source
Source last checked
  1. Revision 4 · amended ·

    Amended from ghsa record GHSA-h3mg-xc3c-68pw

  2. Revision 3 · amended ·

    Reviewed OSV alias/range/CVSS4 correction; package source scopes and original publication preserved. No customer finding resolved.

  3. Revision 2 · amended ·

    Amended from osv record GHSA-h3mg-xc3c-68pw

  4. Revision 1 · created ·

    Published from ghsa record GHSA-h3mg-xc3c-68pw

Agent brief

Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.

# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-101911

Advisory: ip-address: Address6 builds a parse diagnostic proportional to the input with no length bound, allowing a single long string to stall or crash the process
IDs: CVE-2026-101911, GHSA-h3mg-xc3c-68pw
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-101911 (revision 4, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 13:06 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Medium (CVSS 6.3)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: ip-address 10.7.1. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- npm ip-address: affected <= 10.7.0; fixed in 10.7.1

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- `npm ls ip-address --all`: lists every installed copy and version, including transitive ones. Run in the project root after `npm ci`.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on ip-address.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-h3mg-xc3c-68pw (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-h3mg-xc3c-68pw lists affected ranges: npm ip-address >=0 <=10.7.0)
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-h3mg-xc3c-68pw (OSV record GHSA-h3mg-xc3c-68pw lists affected ranges: npm ip-address >=0 <10.7.1 (fixed))

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