SeaweedFS: Hard-coded SSH host key can be presented by certain standalone SFTP Helm deployments

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS 4.0

7.0 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:H/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X · score source

EPSS

• CVE-2026-100413: 0.37% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 30.71 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

SeaweedFS is a distributed storage system for files and blobs. From 4.0.388 until 4.41, the SFTP Helm chart embedded one unencrypted Ed25519 private host key in k8s/charts/seaweedfs/templates/sftp/sftp-secret.yaml as stringData.seaweedfs_sftp_ssh_private_key. A standalone deployment presented that public key when sftp.enabled and sftp.enableAuth were true, sftp.existingConfigSecret was not supplied, the legacy sftp.sshPrivateKey path remained selected, a valid config-ssh Secret allowed startup, and hostKeysFolder did not provide a later Ed25519 signer. An attacker able to redirect or intercept client traffic could impersonate that SFTP endpoint to clients that trusted the published host identity, exposing password credentials or data sent to the rogue endpoint. Default all-in-one and non-authenticated standalone paths did not load the key. This issue is fixed in version 4.41.

Published by the source

21 Oct 2026, 08:59 UTC

Last modified by the source

30 Oct 2026, 10:45 UTC

Source last checked

31 Oct 2026, 07:05 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 31 Oct 2026

   Published from osv record BIT-seaweedfs-2026-100413

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-100413

Advisory: SeaweedFS: Hard-coded SSH host key can be presented by certain standalone SFTP Helm deployments
IDs: CVE-2026-100413, GHSA-hqp5-j79g-vr89
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-100413 (revision 1, source checked 31 Oct 2026, 07:05 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: High (CVSS 7.0)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: seaweedfs 4.41.0. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- Bitnami seaweedfs: affected >= 4.0.388, < 4.41.0; fixed in 4.41.0

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- Bitnami seaweedfs: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on seaweedfs.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/BIT-seaweedfs-2026-100413 (OSV record BIT-seaweedfs-2026-100413 lists affected ranges: Bitnami seaweedfs >=4.0.388 <4.41.0 (fixed))

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