RISC Zero Ethereum invalid commitment with digest value of zero accepted by Steel.validateCommitment

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS 4.0

1.7 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U · score source

EPSS

• CVE-2025-52884: 0.41% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 35.81 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Impact Prior to 2.1.1 and 2.2.0, the Steel.validateCommitment Solidity library function will return true for a crafted commitment with a digest value of zero. This violates the semantics of validateCommitment, as this does not commitment to a block that is in the current chain. Because the digest is zero, it does not correspond to any block and there exist no known openings. As a result, this commitment will never be produced by a correct zkVM guest using Steel. Leveraging this bug to compromise the soundness of an application using Steel would require a separate bug or misuse of the Steel library, which is expected to be used to validate the root of state opening proofs (e.g. having the guest commit to a digest of zero, or failing to check the zkVM proof). Because this bug does not risk application integrity, correctly written applications are not at risk. Fix Please see [#605] for a full description of the bug, and the fix. This fix has been released as part of risc0-ethereum…

Published by the source

25 Jun 2025, 21:27 UTC

Last modified by the source

25 Jun 2025, 21:28 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 15:38 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-gjv3-89hh-9xq2

Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.

# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2025-52884

Advisory: RISC Zero Ethereum invalid commitment with digest value of zero accepted by Steel.validateCommitment
IDs: CVE-2025-52884, GHSA-gjv3-89hh-9xq2
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2025-52884 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:38 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Low (CVSS 1.7)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: risc0-ethereum-contracts 2.1.1. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- crates.io risc0-ethereum-contracts: affected < 2.1.1; fixed in 2.1.1

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- crates.io risc0-ethereum-contracts: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on risc0-ethereum-contracts.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-gjv3-89hh-9xq2 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-gjv3-89hh-9xq2 lists affected ranges: crates.io risc0-ethereum-contracts >=0 <2.1.1)

Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.