Ratify Azure authentication providers can leak authentication tokens to non-Azure container registries
CVE-2025-27403GHSA-44f7-5fj5-h4px
What to do
Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (github.com/deislabs/ratify 1.2.3; github.com/ratify-project/ratify 1.3.2, 1.2.3), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
- Affected
- < 1.2.3
- Fixed in
- 1.2.3
Go github.com/ratify-project/ratify
- Affected
- < 1.2.3>= 1.3.0, < 1.3.2
- Fixed in
- 1.2.3, 1.3.2
Sources
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-44f7-5fj5-h4px lists affected ranges: Go github.com/ratify-project/ratify >=0 =1.3.0 =0 <1.2.3
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS 4.0
- 7.2 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:L · score source
- EPSS
- CVE-2025-27403: 0.48% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 41.57 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
Impact In a Kubernetes environment, Ratify can be configured to authenticate to a private Azure Container Registry (ACR). The Azure workload identity and Azure managed identity authentication providers are configured in this setup. Users that configure a private ACR to be used with the Azure authentication providers may be impacted. Both Azure authentication providers attempt to exchange an Entra ID (EID) token for an ACR refresh token. However, Ratify’s Azure authentication providers did not verify that the target registry is an ACR. This could have led to the EID token being presented to a non-ACR registry during token exchange. EID tokens with ACR access can potentially be extracted and abused if a user workload contains an image reference to a malicious registry. Patches The Azure workload identity and Azure managed identity authentication providers are updated to add new validation prior to EID token exchange. Validation relies upon registry domain validation against a…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from ghsa record GHSA-44f7-5fj5-h4px
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2025-27403 Advisory: Ratify Azure authentication providers can leak authentication tokens to non-Azure container registries IDs: CVE-2025-27403, GHSA-44f7-5fj5-h4px Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2025-27403 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:09 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: High (CVSS 7.2) Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: github.com/deislabs/ratify 1.2.3; github.com/ratify-project/ratify 1.3.2, 1.2.3. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - Go github.com/deislabs/ratify: affected < 1.2.3; fixed in 1.2.3 - Go github.com/ratify-project/ratify: affected < 1.2.3; >= 1.3.0, < 1.3.2; fixed in 1.2.3, 1.3.2 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - Go github.com/deislabs/ratify: check the installed version with your package manager. - Go github.com/ratify-project/ratify: check the installed version with your package manager. ## Supported action Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on github.com/deislabs/ratify, github.com/ratify-project/ratify. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-44f7-5fj5-h4px (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-44f7-5fj5-h4px lists affected ranges: Go github.com/ratify-project/ratify >=0 =1.3.0 =0 <1.2.3) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
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