Go Ethereum vulnerable to DoS via malicious p2p message

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS 4.0

6.6 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U · score source

EPSS

• CVE-2025-24883: 0.69% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 52.96 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Impact A vulnerable node can be forced to shutdown/crash using a specially crafted message. During the peer-to-peer connection handshake, a shared secret key is computed. The implementation did not verify whether the EC public key provided by the remote party is a valid point on the secp256k1 curve. By simply sending an all-zero public key, a crash could be induced due to unexpected results from the handshake. The issue was fixed by adding a curve point validity check in https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/commit/159fb1a1db551c544978dc16a5568a4730b4abf3 Patches A fix has been included in geth version 1.14.13 and onwards. Workarounds Unfortunately, no workaround is available. Credits This issue was originally reported to Polygon Security by David Matosse (@iam-ned).

Published by the source

30 Jan 2025, 17:51 UTC

Last modified by the source

17 Mar 2025, 20:25 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 15:09 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-q26p-9cq4-7fc2

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2025-24883

Advisory: Go Ethereum vulnerable to DoS via malicious p2p message
IDs: CVE-2025-24883, GHSA-q26p-9cq4-7fc2
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2025-24883 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:09 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Medium (CVSS 6.6)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum 1.14.13. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- Go github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum: affected >= 1.14.0, < 1.14.13; fixed in 1.14.13

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- Go github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-q26p-9cq4-7fc2 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-q26p-9cq4-7fc2 lists affected ranges: Go github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum >=1.14.0 <1.14.13)

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