notation-go's timestamp signature generation lacks certificate revocation check
CVE-2024-56138GHSA-45v3-38pc-874v
What to do
Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (github.com/notaryproject/notation-go 1.3.0-rc.2), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
Go github.com/notaryproject/notation-go
- Affected
- >= 1.2.0-beta.1, <= 1.3.0-rc.1
- Fixed in
- 1.3.0-rc.2
Sources
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-45v3-38pc-874v lists affected ranges: Go github.com/notaryproject/notation-go >=1.2.0-beta.1 <=1.3.0-rc.1
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS
- 4.0 · CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
- EPSS
- CVE-2024-56138: 0.13% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 2.82 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
This issue was identified during Quarkslab's audit of the timestamp feature. Summary During the timestamp signature generation, the revocation status of the certificate(s) used to generate the timestamp signature was not verified. Details During timestamp signature generation, notation-go did not check the revocation status of the certificate chain used by the TSA. This oversight creates a vulnerability that could be exploited through a Man-in-The-Middle attack. An attacker could potentially use a compromised, intermediate, or revoked leaf certificate to generate a malicious countersignature, which would then be accepted and stored by notation. Impact This could lead to denial of service scenarios, particularly in CI/CD environments during signature verification processes because timestamp signature would fail due to the presence of a revoked certificate(s) potentially disrupting operations.
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from ghsa record GHSA-45v3-38pc-874v
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2024-56138 Advisory: notation-go's timestamp signature generation lacks certificate revocation check IDs: CVE-2024-56138, GHSA-45v3-38pc-874v Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2024-56138 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:08 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: Medium (CVSS 4.0) Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: github.com/notaryproject/notation-go 1.3.0-rc.2. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - Go github.com/notaryproject/notation-go: affected >= 1.2.0-beta.1, <= 1.3.0-rc.1; fixed in 1.3.0-rc.2 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - Go github.com/notaryproject/notation-go: check the installed version with your package manager. ## Supported action Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on github.com/notaryproject/notation-go. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-45v3-38pc-874v (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-45v3-38pc-874v lists affected ranges: Go github.com/notaryproject/notation-go >=1.2.0-beta.1 <=1.3.0-rc.1) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
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