Access to Archived Argo Workflows with Fake Token in client mode

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS 4.0

6.3 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N · score source

EPSS

• CVE-2024-53862: 0.66% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 51.60 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary When using --auth-mode=client, Archived Workflows can be retrieved with a fake or spoofed token via the GET Workflow endpoint: /api/v1/workflows/{namespace}/{name} When using --auth-mode=sso, all Archived Workflows can be retrieved with a valid token via the GET Workflow endpoint: /api/v1/workflows/{namespace}/{name} Details No authentication is performed by the Server itself on client tokens[^1]. Authentication & authorization is instead delegated to the k8s API server. However, the Workflow Archive does not interact with k8s, and so any token that looks valid will be considered authenticated, even if it is not a k8s token or even if the token has no RBAC for Argo. To handle the lack of pass-through k8s authN/authZ, the Workflow Archive specifically does the equivalent of a kubectl auth can-i check for respective methods. In #12736 / v3.5.7 and #13021 / v3.5.8, the auth check was accidentally removed on the GET Workflow endpoint's fallback to archived workflows on these…

Published by the source

2 Dec 2024, 22:17 UTC

Last modified by the source

2 Dec 2024, 22:17 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 15:08 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-h36c-m3rf-34h9

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2024-53862

Advisory: Access to Archived Argo Workflows with Fake Token in `client` mode
IDs: CVE-2024-53862, GHSA-h36c-m3rf-34h9
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2024-53862 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:08 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Medium (CVSS 6.3)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v3 3.6.2, 3.5.13. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- Go github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v3: affected >= 3.5.7, < 3.5.13; >= 3.6.0, < 3.6.2; fixed in 3.6.2, 3.5.13

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- Go github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v3: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v3.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-h36c-m3rf-34h9 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-h36c-m3rf-34h9 lists affected ranges: Go github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v3 >=3.5.7 =3.6.0 <3.6.2)

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