btcd did not correctly re-implement Bitcoin Core's "FindAndDelete()" functionality
CVE-2024-38365GHSA-27vh-h6mc-q6g8
What to do
Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (github.com/btcsuite/btcd 0.24.2-beta.rc1), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
- Affected
- < 0.24.2-beta.rc1
- Fixed in
- 0.24.2-beta.rc1
Sources
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-27vh-h6mc-q6g8 lists affected ranges: Go github.com/btcsuite/btcd >=0 <0.24.2-beta.rc1
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS 4.0
- 8.3 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N · score source
- EPSS
- CVE-2024-38365: 1.01% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 63.08 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
Impact The btcd Bitcoin client (versions 0.10 to 0.24) did not correctly re-implement Bitcoin Core's "FindAndDelete()" functionality. This logic is consensus-critical: the difference in behavior with the other Bitcoin clients can lead to btcd clients accepting an invalid Bitcoin block (or rejecting a valid one). This consensus failure can be leveraged to cause a chain split (accepting an invalid Bitcoin block) or be exploited to DoS the btcd nodes (rejecting a valid Bitcoin block). An attacker can create a standard transaction where FindAndDelete doesn't return a match but removeOpCodeByData does making btcd get a different sighash, leading to a chain split. Importantly, this vulnerability can be exploited remotely by any Bitcoin user and does not require any hash power. This is because the difference in behavior can be triggered by a "standard" Bitcoin transaction, that is a transaction which gets relayed through the P2P network before it gets included in a Bitcoin block.…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from ghsa record GHSA-27vh-h6mc-q6g8
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2024-38365 Advisory: btcd did not correctly re-implement Bitcoin Core's "FindAndDelete()" functionality IDs: CVE-2024-38365, GHSA-27vh-h6mc-q6g8 Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2024-38365 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:05 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: High (CVSS 8.3) Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: github.com/btcsuite/btcd 0.24.2-beta.rc1. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - Go github.com/btcsuite/btcd: affected < 0.24.2-beta.rc1; fixed in 0.24.2-beta.rc1 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - Go github.com/btcsuite/btcd: check the installed version with your package manager. ## Supported action Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on github.com/btcsuite/btcd. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-27vh-h6mc-q6g8 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-27vh-h6mc-q6g8 lists affected ranges: Go github.com/btcsuite/btcd >=0 <0.24.2-beta.rc1) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
Loading voting…