BoringSSLAEADContext in Netty Repeats Nonces

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

5.9 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N

EPSS

• CVE-2024-36121: 0.27% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 19.08 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary BoringSSLAEADContext keeps track of how many OHTTP responses have been sent and uses this sequence number to calculate the appropriate nonce to use with the encryption algorithm. Unfortunately, two separate errors combine which would allow an attacker to cause the sequence number to overflow and thus the nonce to repeat. Details 1. There is no overflow detection or enforcement of the maximum sequence value. (This is a missed requirement from the draft Chunked Oblivious OHTTP RFC and so should be inherited from the HPKE RFC 9180, Section 5.2). 2. The sequence number (seq) is stored as 32-bit int which is relatively easy to overflow. https://github.com/netty/netty-incubator-codec-ohttp/blob/1ddadb6473cd3be5491d114431ed4c1a9f316001/codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/hpke/boringssl/BoringSSLAEADContext.java#L112-L114 Impact If the BoringSSLAEADContext is used to encrypt more than 2^32 messages then the AES-GCM nonce will repeat. Repeating a…

Published by the source

5 Jun 2024, 16:53 UTC

Last modified by the source

5 Jun 2024, 16:53 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 16:30 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-g762-h86w-8749

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2024-36121

Advisory: BoringSSLAEADContext in Netty Repeats Nonces
IDs: CVE-2024-36121, GHSA-g762-h86w-8749
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2024-36121 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 16:30 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Medium (CVSS 5.9)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-ohttp 0.0.11.Final. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- Maven io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-ohttp: affected >= 0.0.3.Final, < 0.0.11.Final; fixed in 0.0.11.Final

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- Maven io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-ohttp: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-ohttp.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-g762-h86w-8749 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-g762-h86w-8749 lists affected ranges: Maven io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-ohttp >=0.0.3.Final <0.0.11.Final)

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