tls-listener affected by the slow loris vulnerability with default configuration

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

7.5 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

EPSS

• CVE-2024-28854: 0.97% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 62.03 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary With the default configuration of tls-listener, a malicious user can open 6.4 TcpStreams a second, sending 0 bytes, and can trigger a DoS. Details The default configuration options make any public service using TlsListener::new() vulnerable to a slow-loris DoS attack. PoC Running the HTTP TLS server example: https://github.com/tmccombs/tls-listener/blob/6c57dea2d9beb1577ae4d80f6eaf03aad4ef3857/examples/http.rs, then running the following script will prevent new connections to the server. Impact This is an instance of a slow-loris attack). This impacts any publically accessible service using the default configuration of tls-listener Mitigation Previous versions can mitigate this by passing a large value, such as usize::MAX as the parameter to Builder::maxhandshakes.

Published by the source

15 Mar 2024, 19:57 UTC

Last modified by the source

20 May 2024, 15:29 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 15:38 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-2qph-qpvm-2qf7

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2024-28854

Advisory: tls-listener affected by the slow loris vulnerability with default configuration
IDs: CVE-2024-28854, GHSA-2qph-qpvm-2qf7
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2024-28854 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:38 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: High (CVSS 7.5)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: tls-listener 0.10.0. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- crates.io tls-listener: affected <= 0.9.1; fixed in 0.10.0

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- crates.io tls-listener: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on tls-listener.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2qph-qpvm-2qf7 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-2qph-qpvm-2qf7 lists affected ranges: crates.io tls-listener >=0 <=0.9.1)

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