Discovery uses the same AES/GCM Nonce throughout the session

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

not scored

EPSS

• CVE-2024-23688: 0.49% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 42.43 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Discovery uses the same AES/GCM Nonce throughout the session though it should be generated on per message basis which can lead to the leaking of the session key. As the actual ENR record is signed with a different key it is not possible for an attacker to alter the ENR record. Note that the node private key is not compromised, only the session key generated to communicate with an individual peer. From discovery spec: The number of messages which can be encrypted with a certain session key is limited because encryption of each message requires a unique nonce for AES-GCM. In addition to the keys, the session cache must also keep track of the count of outgoing messages to ensure the uniqueness of nonce values. Since the wire protocol uses 96 bit AES-GCM nonces, it is strongly recommended to generate them by encoding the current outgoing message count into the first 32 bits of the nonce and filling the remaining 64 bits with random data generated by a cryptographically secure random…

Published by the source

6 Apr 2021, 17:22 UTC

Last modified by the source

2 Dec 2025, 01:28 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 16:41 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-w3hj-wr2q-x83g

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2024-23688

Advisory: Discovery uses the same AES/GCM Nonce throughout the session
IDs: CVE-2024-23688, GHSA-w3hj-wr2q-x83g
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2024-23688 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 16:41 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Unrated
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: tech.pegasys.discovery:discovery 0.4.5. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- Maven tech.pegasys.discovery:discovery: affected < 0.4.5; fixed in 0.4.5

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- Maven tech.pegasys.discovery:discovery: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on tech.pegasys.discovery:discovery.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-w3hj-wr2q-x83g (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-w3hj-wr2q-x83g lists affected ranges: Maven tech.pegasys.discovery:discovery >=0 <0.4.5)

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