Skip to content

← Actionable
Medium, CVSS 6.5

Ursa CL-Signatures Revocation allows verifiers to generate unique identifiers for holders

CVE-2024-22192GHSA-6698-mhxx-r84g

What to do

Partial vendor fix. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check back for a fix.

This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.

Affected packages

  • crates.io ursa

    Affected
    <= 0.3.7
    Fixed in
    no fixed version recorded
  • crates.io anoncreds-clsignatures

    Affected
    < 0.1.0
    Fixed in
    0.1.0

Sources

Severity and exploitation
Exploitation
No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
CVSS
6.5 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
EPSS
  • CVE-2024-22192: 0.32% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 24.65 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary The revocation scheme that is part of the Ursa CL-Signatures implementations has a flaw that could impact the privacy guarantees defined by the AnonCreds verifiable credential model. Notably, a malicious verifier may be able to generate a unique identifier for a holder providing a verifiable presentation that includes a Non-Revocation proof. Details The revocation scheme that is part of the Ursa CL-Signatures implementations has a flaw that could impact the privacy guarantees defined by the AnonCreds verifiable credential model, potentially allowing a malicious verifier to generate a unique identifier for a holder that provides a verifiable presentation that includes a Non-Revocation proof. The flaws affects all CL-Signature versions published from the [Hyperledger Ursa] repository to the [Ursa Rust Crate], and is fixed in all versions published from the [Hyperledger AnonCreds CL-Signatures] repository to the [AnonCreds CL-Signatures Rust Crate]. The addressing the flaw…

Dates and revisions
Published by the source
Last modified by the source
Source last checked
  1. Revision 1 · created ·

    Published from ghsa record GHSA-6698-mhxx-r84g

Agent brief

Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.

# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2024-22192

Advisory: Ursa CL-Signatures Revocation allows verifiers to generate unique identifiers for holders
IDs: CVE-2024-22192, GHSA-6698-mhxx-r84g
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2024-22192 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:38 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Medium (CVSS 6.5)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Partial vendor fix; fixed versions by package: anoncreds-clsignatures 0.1.0. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- crates.io ursa: affected <= 0.3.7
- crates.io anoncreds-clsignatures: affected < 0.1.0; fixed in 0.1.0

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- crates.io ursa: check the installed version with your package manager.
- crates.io anoncreds-clsignatures: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
No complete vendor fix is recorded. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check this record again before closing anything.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on ursa, anoncreds-clsignatures.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6698-mhxx-r84g (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-6698-mhxx-r84g lists affected ranges: crates.io ursa >=0 =0 <0.1.0)

Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.

Loading voting…