Gitsign's Rekor public keys fetched from upstream API instead of local TUF client.

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

4.2 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

EPSS

• CVE-2023-47122: 0.37% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 30.91 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Impact In certain versions of gitsign, Rekor public keys were fetched via the Rekor API, instead of through the local TUF client. If the upstream Rekor server happened to be compromised, gitsign clients could potentially be tricked into trusting incorrect signatures. There is no known compromise the default public good instance (rekor.sigstore.dev) - anyone using this instance is unlikely to be affected. Patches This was fixed in v0.8.0 via https://github.com/sigstore/gitsign/pull/399 Workarounds n/a References Are there any links users can visit to find out more? https://docs.sigstore.dev/about/threat-model/#sigstore-threat-model

Published by the source

14 Nov 2023, 20:31 UTC

Last modified by the source

14 Nov 2023, 20:31 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 15:00 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-xvrc-2wvh-49vc

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2023-47122

Advisory: Gitsign's Rekor public keys fetched from upstream API instead of local TUF client.
IDs: CVE-2023-47122, GHSA-xvrc-2wvh-49vc
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2023-47122 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:00 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Medium (CVSS 4.2)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: github.com/sigstore/gitsign 0.8.0. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- Go github.com/sigstore/gitsign: affected >= 0.6.0, < 0.8.0; fixed in 0.8.0

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- Go github.com/sigstore/gitsign: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on github.com/sigstore/gitsign.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xvrc-2wvh-49vc (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-xvrc-2wvh-49vc lists affected ranges: Go github.com/sigstore/gitsign >=0.6.0 <0.8.0)

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