Cosign vulnerable to possible endless data attack from attacker-controlled registry
CVE-2023-46737GHSA-vfp6-jrw2-99g9
What to do
Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (github.com/sigstore/cosign 1.13.2; github.com/sigstore/cosign/v2 2.2.1), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
- Affected
- <= 1.13.1
- Fixed in
- 1.13.2
Go github.com/sigstore/cosign/v2
- Affected
- < 2.2.1
- Fixed in
- 2.2.1
Sources
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-vfp6-jrw2-99g9 lists affected ranges: Go github.com/sigstore/cosign/v2 >=0 =0 <=1.13.1
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS
- 3.1 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
- EPSS
- CVE-2023-46737: 0.64% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 50.71 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
Summary Cosign is susceptible to a denial of service by an attacker controlled registry. An attacker who controls a remote registry can return a high number of attestations and/or signatures to Cosign and cause Cosign to enter a long loop resulting in an endless data attack. The root cause is that Cosign loops through all attestations fetched from the remote registry in pkg/cosign.FetchAttestations. The attacker needs to compromise the registry or make a request to a registry they control. When doing so, the attacker must return a high number of attestations in the response to Cosign. The result will be that the attacker can cause Cosign to go into a long or infinite loop that will prevent other users from verifying their data. In Kyvernos case, an attacker whose privileges are limited to making requests to the cluster can make a request with an image reference to their own registry, trigger the infinite loop and deny other users from completing their admission requests.…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from ghsa record GHSA-vfp6-jrw2-99g9
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2023-46737 Advisory: Cosign vulnerable to possible endless data attack from attacker-controlled registry IDs: CVE-2023-46737, GHSA-vfp6-jrw2-99g9 Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2023-46737 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:00 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: Low (CVSS 3.1) Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: github.com/sigstore/cosign 1.13.2; github.com/sigstore/cosign/v2 2.2.1. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - Go github.com/sigstore/cosign: affected <= 1.13.1; fixed in 1.13.2 - Go github.com/sigstore/cosign/v2: affected < 2.2.1; fixed in 2.2.1 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - Go github.com/sigstore/cosign: check the installed version with your package manager. - Go github.com/sigstore/cosign/v2: check the installed version with your package manager. ## Supported action Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on github.com/sigstore/cosign, github.com/sigstore/cosign/v2. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-vfp6-jrw2-99g9 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-vfp6-jrw2-99g9 lists affected ranges: Go github.com/sigstore/cosign/v2 >=0 =0 <=1.13.1) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
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