mx-chain-go's relayed transactions always increment nonce
CVE-2023-34458GHSA-j494-7x2v-vvvp
What to do
Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (github.com/multiversx/mx-chain-go 1.4.17), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
Go github.com/multiversx/mx-chain-go
- Affected
- < 1.4.17
- Fixed in
- 1.4.17
Sources
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-j494-7x2v-vvvp lists affected ranges: Go github.com/multiversx/mx-chain-go >=0 <1.4.17
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS
- 7.1 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:H
- EPSS
- CVE-2023-34458: 1.32% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 70.89 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
Impact When executing a relayed transaction, if the inner transaction failed, it would have increased the inner transaction's sender account nonce. This could have contributed to a limited DoS attack on a targeted account. The fix is a breaking change so a new flag RelayedNonceFixEnableEpoch was needed. This was a strict processing issue while validating blocks on a chain. Patches v1.4.17 and later versions contain the fix for this issue Workarounds there were no workarounds for this issue. The affected account could only wait for the DoS attack to finish as the attack was not free or to attempt to send transactions in a very fast manner so as to compete on the same nonce with the attacker. References For the future understanding of this issue, on v1.4.17 and onwards versions, we have this integration test that addresses the issue and tests the fix.…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from ghsa record GHSA-j494-7x2v-vvvp
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2023-34458 Advisory: mx-chain-go's relayed transactions always increment nonce IDs: CVE-2023-34458, GHSA-j494-7x2v-vvvp Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2023-34458 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 14:59 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: High (CVSS 7.1) Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: github.com/multiversx/mx-chain-go 1.4.17. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - Go github.com/multiversx/mx-chain-go: affected < 1.4.17; fixed in 1.4.17 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - Go github.com/multiversx/mx-chain-go: check the installed version with your package manager. ## Supported action Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on github.com/multiversx/mx-chain-go. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-j494-7x2v-vvvp (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-j494-7x2v-vvvp lists affected ranges: Go github.com/multiversx/mx-chain-go >=0 <1.4.17) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
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