Buildkit credentials inlined to Git URLs could end up in provenance attestation

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

6.5 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

EPSS

• CVE-2023-26054: 1.03% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 63.64 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

When the user sends a build request that contains a Git URL that contains credentials and the build creates a provenance attestation describing that build, these credentials could be visible from the provenance attestation. Git URL can be passed in two ways: 1) Invoking build directly from a URL with credentials. Equivalent in docker buildx would be 2) If the client sends additional VCS info hint parameters on builds from a local source. Usually, that would mean reading the origin URL from .git/config file. Thanks to Oscar Alberto Tovar for discovering the issue. Impact When a build is performed under specific conditions where credentials were passed to BuildKit they may be visible to everyone who has access to provenance attestation. Provenance attestations and VCS info hints were added in version v0.11.0. Previous versions are not vulnerable. In v0.10, when building directly from Git URL, the same URL could be visible in BuildInfo structure that is a predecessor of Provenance…

Published by the source

7 Mar 2023, 20:09 UTC

Last modified by the source

20 Sep 2023, 17:38 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 14:59 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-gc89-7gcr-jxqc

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2023-26054

Advisory: Buildkit credentials inlined to Git URLs could end up in provenance attestation
IDs: CVE-2023-26054, GHSA-gc89-7gcr-jxqc
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2023-26054 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 14:59 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Medium (CVSS 6.5)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: github.com/moby/buildkit 0.11.4. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- Go github.com/moby/buildkit: affected >= 0.10.0, < 0.11.4; fixed in 0.11.4

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- Go github.com/moby/buildkit: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on github.com/moby/buildkit.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-gc89-7gcr-jxqc (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-gc89-7gcr-jxqc lists affected ranges: Go github.com/moby/buildkit >=0.10.0 <0.11.4)

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