openssl-src subject to Timing Oracle in RSA Decryption

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

5.9 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

EPSS

• CVE-2022-4304: 23.51% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 97.80 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

A timing based side channel exists in the OpenSSL RSA Decryption implementation which could be sufficient to recover a plaintext across a network in a Bleichenbacher style attack. To achieve a successful decryption an attacker would have to be able to send a very large number of trial messages for decryption. The vulnerability affects all RSA padding modes: PKCS#1 v1.5, RSA-OEAP and RSASVE. For example, in a TLS connection, RSA is commonly used by a client to send an encrypted pre-master secret to the server. An attacker that had observed a genuine connection between a client and a server could use this flaw to send trial messages to the server and record the time taken to process them. After a sufficiently large number of messages the attacker could recover the pre-master secret used for the original connection and thus be able to decrypt the application data sent over that connection.

Published by the source

8 Feb 2023, 22:31 UTC

Last modified by the source

4 Nov 2025, 22:08 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 15:39 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-p52g-cm5j-mjv4

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2022-4304

Advisory: openssl-src subject to Timing Oracle in RSA Decryption
IDs: CVE-2022-4304, GHSA-p52g-cm5j-mjv4
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2022-4304 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:39 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Medium (CVSS 5.9)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: openssl-src 300.0.12, 111.25.0. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- crates.io openssl-src: affected < 111.25.0; >= 300.0.0, < 300.0.12; fixed in 111.25.0, 300.0.12

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- crates.io openssl-src: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on openssl-src.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-p52g-cm5j-mjv4 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-p52g-cm5j-mjv4 lists affected ranges: crates.io openssl-src >=0 =300.0.0 <300.0.12)

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