Pion/DLTS Accepts Client Certificates Without CertificateVerify

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

5.9 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

EPSS

• CVE-2022-29222: 0.83% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 57.44 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Impact A DTLS Client could provide a Certificate that it doesn't posses the private key for and Pion DTLS wouldn't reject it. This issue affects users that are using Client certificates only. The connection itself is still secure. The Certificate provided by clients can't be trusted when using a Pion DTLS server prior to v2.1.5 Patches Upgrade to Pion DTLS v2.1.5 Workarounds No workarounds available, upgrade to Pion DTLS v2.1.5 References Thank you to Juho Nurminen and the Mattermost team for discovering and reporting this. For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: Open an issue in Pion DTLS Email us at team@pion.ly

Published by the source

25 May 2022, 19:26 UTC

Last modified by the source

29 Aug 2023, 23:28 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 14:58 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-w45j-f832-hxvh

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2022-29222

Advisory: Pion/DLTS Accepts Client Certificates Without CertificateVerify
IDs: CVE-2022-29222, GHSA-w45j-f832-hxvh
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2022-29222 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 14:58 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Medium (CVSS 5.9)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: github.com/pion/dtls/v2 2.1.5; github.com/pion/dtls 2.1.5. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- Go github.com/pion/dtls/v2: affected < 2.1.5; fixed in 2.1.5
- Go github.com/pion/dtls: affected < 2.1.5; fixed in 2.1.5

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- Go github.com/pion/dtls/v2: check the installed version with your package manager.
- Go github.com/pion/dtls: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on github.com/pion/dtls/v2, github.com/pion/dtls.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-w45j-f832-hxvh (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-w45j-f832-hxvh lists affected ranges: Go github.com/pion/dtls >=0 =0 <2.1.5)

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