scs-library-client may leak user credentials to third-party service via HTTP redirect

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

5.2 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N

EPSS

• CVE-2022-23538: 0.74% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 54.74 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Impact When the scs-library-client is used to pull a container image, with authentication, the HTTP Authorization header sent by the client to the library service may be incorrectly leaked to an S3 backing storage provider. This occurs in a specific flow, where the library service redirects the client to a backing S3 storage server, to perform a multi-part concurrent download. Depending on site configuration, the S3 service may be provided by a third party. An attacker with access to the S3 service may be able to extract user credentials, allowing them to impersonate the user. The vulnerable multi-part concurrent download flow, with redirect to S3, is only used when communicating with a Singularity Enterprise 1.x installation, or third party server implementing this flow. Interaction with Singularity Enterprise 2.x, and Singularity Container Services (cloud.sylabs.io), does not trigger the vulnerable flow. We encourage all users to update. Users who interact with a Singularity…

Published by the source

20 Jan 2023, 22:38 UTC

Last modified by the source

17 Feb 2023, 22:59 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 14:55 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-7p8m-22h4-9pj7

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2022-23538

Advisory: scs-library-client may leak user credentials to third-party service via HTTP redirect
IDs: CVE-2022-23538, GHSA-7p8m-22h4-9pj7
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2022-23538 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 14:55 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Medium (CVSS 5.2)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: github.com/sylabs/scs-library-client 1.4.2, 1.3.4. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- Go github.com/sylabs/scs-library-client: affected >= 1.4.0, < 1.4.2; < 1.3.4; fixed in 1.4.2, 1.3.4

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- Go github.com/sylabs/scs-library-client: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on github.com/sylabs/scs-library-client.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7p8m-22h4-9pj7 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-7p8m-22h4-9pj7 lists affected ranges: Go github.com/sylabs/scs-library-client >=1.4.0 =0 <1.3.4)

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