Cookie persistence after password changes in symfony/security-bundle

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

6.5 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

EPSS

• CVE-2021-41268: 1.32% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 70.98 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Description ----------- Since the rework of the Remember me cookie in Symfony 5.3, the cookie is not invalidated anymore when the user changes its password. Attackers can therefore maintain their access to the account even if the password is changed as long as they have had the chance to login once and get a valid remember me cookie. Resolution ---------- Symfony now makes the password part of the signature by default. In that way, when the password changes then the cookie is not valid anymore. The patch for this issue is available here for branch 5.3. Credits ------- We would like to thank Thibaut Decherit for reporting the issue and Wouter J for fixing the issue.

Published by the source

24 Nov 2021, 20:05 UTC

Last modified by the source

5 Feb 2024, 11:13 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 14:15 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-qw36-p97w-vcqr

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2021-41268

Advisory: Cookie persistence after password changes in symfony/security-bundle
IDs: CVE-2021-41268, GHSA-qw36-p97w-vcqr
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2021-41268 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 14:15 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Medium (CVSS 6.5)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: symfony/symfony 5.3.12; symfony/security-bundle 5.3.12. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- Packagist symfony/symfony: affected >= 5.3.0, < 5.3.12; fixed in 5.3.12
- Packagist symfony/security-bundle: affected >= 5.3.0, < 5.3.12; fixed in 5.3.12

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- Packagist symfony/symfony: check the installed version with your package manager.
- Packagist symfony/security-bundle: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on symfony/symfony, symfony/security-bundle.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-qw36-p97w-vcqr (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-qw36-p97w-vcqr lists affected ranges: Packagist symfony/security-bundle >=5.3.0 =5.3.0 <5.3.12)

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