Hard-Coded Key Used For Remember-me Token in Opencast

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

6.8 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

EPSS

• CVE-2020-5222: 0.94% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 60.97 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Impact The security configuration in etc/security/mhdefaultorg.xml enables a remember-me cookie based on a hash created from the username, password, and an additional system key. Opencast has hard-coded this system key in the large XML file and never mentions to change this, basically ensuring that all systems use the same key: This means that an attacker getting access to a remember-me token for one server can get access to all servers which allow log-in using the same credentials without ever needing the credentials. For example, a remember-me token obtained from develop.opencast.org can be used on stable.opencast.org without actually knowing the log-in credentials. Such an attack will usually not work on different installations – assuming that safe, unique passwords are used – but it is basically guaranteed to work to get access to all machines of one cluster if a token from one machine is compromised. Patches This problem is fixed in Opencast 7.6 and Opencast 8.1 Workarounds We…

Published by the source

30 Jan 2020, 21:21 UTC

Last modified by the source

9 Jan 2023, 05:02 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 15:52 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-mh8g-hprg-8363

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2020-5222

Advisory: Hard-Coded Key Used For Remember-me Token in Opencast
IDs: CVE-2020-5222, GHSA-mh8g-hprg-8363
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2020-5222 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:52 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Medium (CVSS 6.8)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: org.opencastproject:opencast-kernel 8.1, 7.6. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- Maven org.opencastproject:opencast-kernel: affected < 7.6; >= 8.0, < 8.1; fixed in 8.1, 7.6

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- Maven org.opencastproject:opencast-kernel: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on org.opencastproject:opencast-kernel.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mh8g-hprg-8363 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-mh8g-hprg-8363 lists affected ranges: Maven org.opencastproject:opencast-kernel >=0 =8.0 <8.1)

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