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Medium, CVSS 5.3

Consensus flaw during block processing in github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum

CVE-2020-26265GHSA-xw37-57qp-9mm4

What to do

Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum 1.9.20), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.

This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.

Affected packages

Sources

Severity and exploitation
Exploitation
No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
CVSS
5.3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
EPSS
  • CVE-2020-26265: 0.92% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 60.32 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Impact A consensus-vulnerability in Geth could cause a chain split, where vulnerable versions refuse to accept the canonical chain. Description A flaw was repoted at 2020-08-11 by John Youngseok Yang (Software Platform Lab), where a particular sequence of transactions could cause a consensus failure. - Tx 1: - sender invokes caller. - caller invokes 0xaa. 0xaa has 3 wei, does a self-destruct-to-self - caller does a 1 wei -call to 0xaa, who thereby has 1 wei (the code in 0xaa still executed, since the tx is still ongoing, but doesn't redo the selfdestruct, it takes a different path if callvalue is non-zero) - Tx 2: - sender does a 5-wei call to 0xaa. No exec (since no code). In geth, the result would be that 0xaa had 6 wei, whereas OE reported (correctly) 5 wei. Furthermore, in geth, if the second tx was not executed, the 0xaa would be destructed, resulting in 0 wei. Thus obviously wrong. It was determined that the root cause was this commit from this PR. The semantics of createObject…

Dates and revisions
Published by the source
Last modified by the source
Source last checked
  1. Revision 1 · created ·

    Published from ghsa record GHSA-xw37-57qp-9mm4

Agent brief

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2020-26265

Advisory: Consensus flaw during block processing in github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum
IDs: CVE-2020-26265, GHSA-xw37-57qp-9mm4
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2020-26265 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 14:55 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Medium (CVSS 5.3)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum 1.9.20. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- Go github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum: affected >= 1.9.4, < 1.9.20; fixed in 1.9.20

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- Go github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xw37-57qp-9mm4 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-xw37-57qp-9mm4 lists affected ranges: Go github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum >=1.9.4 <1.9.20)

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