Header Forgery in http-signature

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

7.5 · CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

EPSS

• CVE-2017-16005: 0.84% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 58.01 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Affected versions of http-signature contain a vulnerability which can allow an attacker in a privileged network position to modify header names and change the meaning of the request, without requiring an updated signature. This problem occurs because vulnerable versions of http-signature sign the contents of headers, but not the header names. Proof of Concept Consider this to be the initial, untampered request: And the request is intercepted and tampered as follows: In the resulting responses, both requests would pass signature verification without issue. Recommendation Update to version 0.10.0 or higher.

Published by the source

9 Nov 2018, 17:49 UTC

Last modified by the source

8 Nov 2023, 03:58 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 12:25 UTC

1. Revision 2 · amended · 26 Oct 2026

   Amended from ghsa record GHSA-q257-vv4p-fg92

2. Revision 1 · created · 24 Oct 2026

   Published from osv record GHSA-q257-vv4p-fg92

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2017-16005

Advisory: Header Forgery in http-signature
IDs: CVE-2017-16005, GHSA-q257-vv4p-fg92
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2017-16005 (revision 2, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 12:25 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: High (CVSS 7.5)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: http-signature 0.10.0. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- npm http-signature: affected < 0.10.0; fixed in 0.10.0

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- `npm ls http-signature --all`: lists every installed copy and version, including transitive ones. Run in the project root after `npm ci`.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on http-signature.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-q257-vv4p-fg92 (OSV record GHSA-q257-vv4p-fg92 lists affected ranges: npm http-signature >=0 <0.10.0 (fixed))
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-q257-vv4p-fg92 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-q257-vv4p-fg92 lists affected ranges: npm http-signature >=0 <0.10.0)

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